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Society News

Ecological tax reform

A

growing international trend
is for governments to shift
tbe burden of taxation away
from productive activities and onto
pollutants. This trend is rooted in
the recognition that taxes not only
raise necessary revenue for governments, but also discourage the taxed
activity. When levied on productive
activities, taxes place an extra burden
on the economy, whereas when levied
on pollution, taxes help to control it.
These principles are simple and powerful, but they come with a suite of
ancillary issues, including concerns
about fairness, economic efficiency,
jobs, and disruption during the period
of transition to the new taxes.
Recent proposals for tax reform in
the United States have centered on the
relative merits of taxes on labor, capital, wealth, and consumption. But all
of these tax bases stem from generally
constructive activities, which the proposed taxes penalize and discourage.
For example, taxing labor income tends
to discourage employment by making
labor more expensive to employers
and employment less profitable for
workers.
At the same time, the United States
faces costly problems of environmental pollution and natural resource
depletion at local, national, and global scales. The methods of addressing
these problems have often involved
regulations tbat are sometimes ineffi-
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18-19March 1996 in College Park,
MD. The workshop was organized
by the International Society for
Ecological Economics and supported by a grant from The Jobn
D. and Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation.
cient, as well as direct government
expenditures of tax dollars. The
United States also faces the threat of
losing jobs in traditional manufacturing sectors due to technological
change and increasing international
competition, especially from countries with low production costs.
Many Americans have also experienced a trend of declining wages,
and disparities in income between
rich and poor have increased.
Alternative taxes that shift the burden of taxation away from the useful
products of the economy and onto
undesirable byproducts have been proposed by numerous authors (Kaufmann 1991, Agostini et al. 1992,
Repetto et al. 1992, Von Weizsacker
andjesinghaus 1992, Anderson 1993,
Jorgenson and Wilcoxen 1993, Kohn
1993, Nordhaus 1993, Repetto et al.
1993, Oates 1994, Goulder 1995,
Hammond et al. 1997, Repetto and
Austin 1997). Such "ecological" tax
reform has the potential to ease both
the burden of taxation on parts of the
economy and the burden of the
economy on the environment. Given
the potential benefits of such a tax
shift, we believe tbat it deserves serious consideration as an alternative to
the current tax structure.

by Steve Bernow, Robert
Costanza, Herman Daly,
Ralph DeGennaro, Dawn
Erlandson, Deeobn Ferris, Paul
Hawken, J. Andrew Hoerner,
In this article, we have incorporated input from a broad cross-section
Jill Lancelot, Thomas Marx,
interests to develop tbe general outDouglas Norland, Irene Peters, of
line of a nearly revenue neutral ecoDavid Roodman, Claudine
logical tax reform package that would
Schneider, Priya Shyamsundar, shift some of the burden of taxation
away from economic "goods" and
and Jobn Woodwell
March 1998

onto economic and ecological "bads."
Our intention is to stimulate further
discussion and refinement of the ideas.
The policy guidelines we outline are
designed to serve multiple objectives,
including reducing pollution, improving the cost-effectiveness of pollution
control, creating jobs, boosting wages,
and preserving or increasing the
progressivity of the tax structure.

Historical perspective
The argument that polluters should
pay for the damage they inflict dates
back at least to the 1920 writings of
the economist Arthur C. Pigou. Pigou
argued that a pollution tax should be
set such that an increment of pollution
would incur a tax that is equal to the
costs that the pollution imposes on
others, including costs to health, property, and the environment (Pigou
1920). Requiring individual polluters
to pay for the economic costs that
their pollution imposes on society provides them with an appropriate incentive to reduce their own pollution.
This incentive also allows polluters
maximum flexibility in deciding how
to control pollution; consequently, it
is sometimes more cost-effective than
some other pollution control policies.
Recent analyses have emphasized
that pollution taxes can not only curb
pollution, but also fund cuts in other
levies, raising the prospect of benefits
to both the economy and the environment. Recent work on the possibility
of such a "double dividend" shows
that the relationships between tax shifts
and the performance of the economy
are intricate; they are difficult to predict and are sensitive to the distortions of preexisting taxes. In particular, the potential effect on economic
efficiency of a tax shift onto pollution
is difficult to anticipate. A growing
body of research indicates that the
effect could range from a small net
reduction in efficiency to a small net
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industry to respond to market forces
to control ozone-depleting chemicals
in cost-effective ways (Hoerner 1995).
Several market-oriented approaches
to pollution control have been adopted
outside of the United States. These
approaches, especially those used in
northern Europe, reflect a growing
trend to use taxes creatively as a tool
to stimulate appropriate kinds of economic development. The Netherlands,
for example, places a levy on industrial discharges into waterways according to biological oxygen demand
and concentrations of heavy metals in
the effluent. The levy was first developed to pay for water treatment, but it
has also encouraged more than twothirds of the affected industries to develop private treatment processes and
dramatically reduce their effluents
(Hotte et al. 1995). These new taxes
are part of a trend throughout all of
Scandinavia of increasing reliance on
"green" taxes. Some of the new taxes
have served not as supplements to
preexisting taxes, but as partial reSome ecological taxes have already placements. In 1991, for example,
been implemented, giving economists Sweden moved USS2.4 billion, or
sufficient experience with these taxes 1.9%, of its total tax base onto sulfur
to justify considering their more wide- dioxide and carbon dioxide emissions.
spread use. For example, the Montreal The tax on sulfur dioxide had an imProtocol of 1987 set production caps mediate effect, with emissions falling
on ozone-depleting substances, which 16% in the first year. In 1993 and
the Environmental Protection Agency 1995, Denmark enacted a suite of
(EPA) first attempted to enforce with ecological taxes, including ones on
a system of tradable permits. The US carbon dioxide emissions, water use,
Congress subsequently passed into law pesticides, and batteries (Roodman
a tax on chlorofluorcarbons (CFCs) 1997).
and other ozone-depleting chemicals;
this tax rises annually by $0.45 per
As another example of a marketpound of CFC equivalent. This 1989 oriented approach to pollution conlaw is an example of a tax that has trol, in 1993 Sweden placed a broadboth raised substantial revenue and based tax on net carbon dioxide
effectively controlled pollution: It has emissions equivalent to approximately
raised several billion dollars in rev- US$75 per ton of coal. The tax has
enue while rapidly depressing the pro- since been raised, with certain reducduction of ozone-depleting chemicals tions for industry. Because many facand stimulating the production of more tors contribute to carbon dioxide emisbenign alternatives. Even with the regu- sions, attributing the problem to any
latory caps in place, dramatic declines single factor is difficult. Energy taxes,
in CFC production in the United States especially those on motor fuel, have
coincided with the imposition of the helped to stimulate energy efficiency
tax, strongly suggesting that it was the and the development of other sources
tax—and not the regulatory cap—that of fuels, and these taxes are, in part,
spurred this dramatic decline. The tax responsible for 25 years of declining
has, moreover, curbed production of rates of carbon dioxide emissions in
ozone-depleting chemicals at a pace Sweden even though industrial output
that exceeds the more stringent 1990 has grown (Olivecrona 1995). The
Adjustments and Amendments to the efficiency improvements in Sweden and
Montreal Protocol. Instead of dictat- other countries with broad-based ening a specific means of pollution con- ergy taxes strongly suggest that these
trol, the tax provides an incentive for taxes are more effective at curbing
increase, not counting the benefits of
reduced pollution (Oates 1994,
Bovenberg and Cnossen 1995, Felder
and Schleiniger 1995, Goulder 1995,
Schob 1996, Repetto and Austin 1997).
Thus, the benefits of reduced pollution can be achieved with a small
efficiency loss to the rest of the economy
or, perhaps, an even efficiency gain.
Cutting taxes on wages increases
real income and also tends to stimulate employment (Pearce and Turner
1990, Oates 1991, Gee 1994, Goulder
1995, Majocchi 1996). In western Europe, for example, where reducing unemployment is a top priority, lowering
wage taxes would encourage the hiring of workers. In the United States,
where unemployment rates are lower
but wages are falling for many workers, tax cuts could be targeted at the
first dollars of wage income. These tax
cuts would help to reverse the trend of
declining wages for a broad crosssection of wage earners, including the
working poor.
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emissions than more narrow regulations on individual energy-consuming
processes and products, such as those
in the United States (Von Weizsacket
and Jesinghaus 1992).

A proposal for ecological
tax reform
The following general proposal for
ecological tax reform draws on many
current concepts. It addresses the objectives of economic performance, reduced pollution, and tax progressivity.
This proposed ecological tax reform
would help to move the economy toward natural resource efficiency, technological innovation, and new investment opportunities. The tax reform
would also spur on and give direction
to technological innovation, encouraging clean technologies. This stimulation would, in turn, create opportunities for export and help the work
force to move into emerging industries. The ecological tax reform policy
would contain provisions to ease the
burden of transition on communities
while maintaining near revenue neutrality. These proposed changes to the
tax structure are designed to advance
the protection of the environment while
maintaining economic efficiency and
maintaining or increasing the progressivity of the tax system.
Levy taxes on pollution (e.g., particulates, carbon dioxide, ozone precursors, and other noxious substances).

Taxes on carbon dioxide and other
pollutants of both air and water have
been shown to be administratively
workable and also effective at raising
revenue and curbing pollution. As a
supplement to some regulations and
as an alternative to others, these taxes
allow both industries and individuals
a broad spectrum of options to control
pollution in cost-effective ways.
Rebate this revenue to the taxpayers in
a way that would maintain a progressive tax structure. For example, re-

duce payroll taxes on labor (both employee and employer contributions)
by removing payroll taxes from the
first dollars of wage income. Income
taxes are progressive in that the average tax, as a percentage of income,
rises as income rises. Consumption
taxes tend to be more regressive than
income taxes because the average tax
BioScience VoL 48 No. 3

rate does not necessarily rise with increases in consumption. Taxes on pollution are a form of consumption tax
and so tend to be more regressive than
taxes on income. Taxes related to energy use are especially regressive because people with low incomes tend to
spend disproportionately more of their
income on energy than do people with
higher incomes. A zero tax bracket on
v^age income could be structured to
offset the regressivity of the pollution
tax or even to enhance the overall
progressivity of the tax system. Wage
earners with low incomes would thus
be protected as a class from a net
increase in taxes. As with any tax shift,
some individuals within each income
class would fare better than others,
but the overall effect would be to
preserve or increase the progressivity
of the tax structure. By easing the
payroll tax burden from the first dollars of wage income, a broad class of
wage earners would benefit from the
increase in income, including those
with low incomes.
Phase the tax shift in gradually and
predictably over a number of years to
help ensure an orderly, low-cost transition. An important concern of business and industry is to be able to
anticipate and plan for investment. A
second concern of the government is
to maintain a reasonably stable and
predictable stream of revenue from
the new taxes. Because the tax base
would shrink as less pollution is produced, the taxes could be adjusted
upward or gradually broadened over
time to make up for the lost tax revenue. A phase-in period announced
well in advance would stimulate a
smooth, more efficient response to the
tax shift. A 10-year phase-in would
take advantage of some normal capital replacement and reduce the transition cost. As examples, the US ozonedepleting chemicals tax, with its
predictable annual rise, and the German tax on lead in gasoline, with its
10-year phase-in, have allowed industry time to plan accordingly (Schnutenhaus 1995).

eling Forum includes scenarios with a
50-year phase-in period. If the tax on
carbon dioxide emissions were initially set at $22.50 per ton of carbon
and raised to $250 per ton of carbon
over a 50-year period, the equivalent
tax on gasoline would rise from its
initial $0.06 per gallon to $0.69 per
gallon over that period. The models
indicate that the tax would stabilize
the carbon dioxide concentration in
the atmosphere at approximately 65%
above pre-industrial levels (John
Weyant, Stanford University, manuscript in preparation). A revenue-neutral, phased approach to a carbon
dioxide tax is increasingly popular
among those advocating ecological tax
reform (e.g.. Bach et al. 1994,
Hammond et al. 1997).
Figures from the Congressional
Budget Office (CBO) put tbe magnitude of the tax in perspective. The
CBOestimatesthataUStaxof$19.50
per ton of carbon would raise approximately $14.3 billion in 1998
(CBO 1997). Returned to 146.6 million workers through a reduction in
their payroll tax, the rebate would
average approximately $97.50 per
worker (Social Security Administration, Washington, DC, manuscript in
preparation). The carbon tax and corresponding reduction in payroll taxes
could then be scaled up over time. If
the tax were $50 per ton, the rebate
would be approximately $250 per
worker.
In addition to the potential carbon
tax, CBO estimates of potential revenue from a suite of taxes on air pollutants and water pollutants total
$47.4 billion in 1998. The potential
taxes on water pollutants, which coyer
biological oxygen demand and five
categories of toxic pollutants, would
yield $1.4 billion in 1998. For air
pollutants from stationary sources,
CBO estimates that taxes of $300
per ton of sulfur dioxide, $3000 per
ton of nitrogen oxides, $1900 per
ton of particulate matter, and $4000
per ton of volatile organic compounds would raise $2.4 billion,
$15.2 billion, $2.2 billion, and $26.2
billion, respectively, in the first year
(CBO 1997).

As an initial step, part of the tax
burden could steadily be shifted away
from income and onto carbon dioxide. Although a 10-year phase-in pe- Use a small fraction of the tax revriod would allow business and indus- enue to provide transitional assistry to plan ahead, a review of economic tance for communities, workers, and
models by the Stanford Energy Mod- pollution-intensive industries that are

strongly affected by the tax and to
support the development of clean
technologies. Even if the tax shift is
phased in predictably over time, some
workers would be displaced as industries shift to less polluting practices. Communities that have many
jobs in polluting industries would be
affected most strongly. This transitional assistance would provide job
training and job placement, and it
would facilitate the creation of new
jobs in clean industries. It would
also accelerate the transition to a
cleaner economy.
Address the implications for international competitiveness of those industries that are most affected by the tax.
Provisions could include international
coordination, tariff adjustments at the
border to compensate for tbe tax, resource efficiency investment credits,
or other mechanisms. A tax shift in
the United States would be in step
with sentiment within the European
Union and would follow a broader
international trend toward the use of
ecological taxes (Hoerner and Muller
1993). Any tax shift would have some
effect on the international competitiveness of some industries. To address this effect, a compensatory
import tariff could be levied on goods
manufactured in countries with less
stringent environmental policies. A
compensatory tax rebate on exports
would go further to ensure competitiveness, but it would undermine the
effectiveness of the tax.

Conclusion
The strength of this proposal is the
immutable logic of taxing what we
would like to get rid of instead of
taxing productive activities. Transitional costs and other concerns are a
part of this intricate issue of shifting
the burden of taxation. An important
component of the proposal is its near
revenue neutrality, which tends to reduce adverse effects on macroeconomic
performance and to preserve tax
progressivity.
The challenge of developing a workable tax reform package is one of
finding common ground among disparate concerns. Our proposal reflects
our concerns for the environment,
jobs, income, productivity, and other
dimensions of economic perfor195

March 1998

International Casebook of Leading Practices.
London: Eartbscan Publications.
Hoerner JA, Muller F. 1993. The impact of a
broad-based energy tax on tbe competitiveness of US industry. The Natural Resources
Tax Review July/August: 428-458.
Hotte M, Vlies J, Hafkamp W. 1995. Levy on
Acknowledgments
surface water in the Netherlands. Pages 220230 in Gale R, Barg S, Gillies A, eds. Green
Robert Costanza and Herman Daly
Budget Reform: An International Casebook
led the workshop from which this
of Leading Practices. London: Earthscan
article resulted, and John Woodwell
Publications.
drafted many of the supporting ar- Jorgenson D, Wilcoxen P. 1993. Reducing U.S.
carbon emissions: An econometric general
guments in this paper. The views
equilibrium assessment. Resource and Enexpressed here are those of the auergy Economics 15: 7-25.
thors. Authors' affiliations are in- Kaufmann R. 1991. Limits on the effectiveness
cluded for purposes of identification
of a carbon tax. Energy Journal 12: 139144.
only and do not imply endorsement
Kohn R. 1993. Pigouvian penalty for oil spills.
by any organization.
Energy Economics 15: 197-204.
Majocchi A. 1996. Green fiscal reform and
employment: A survey. Environmental and
References cited
Resource Economics 8: 375-397.
Agostini P, Botteon M, Carraro C. 1992. A Nordhaus W. 1993. Rolling the 'DICE': An
optimal transition path for controlling greencarbon tax to reduce CO, emissions in Euhouse gases. Resource and Energy Economrope. Energy Economics 14: 279-290.
ics 15:27-50.
Anderson V. 1993. Energy Efficiency Policies.
London: Routiedge.
Oates W. 1991. Pollution charges as a source of
public revenues. Washington (DC): Resources
Bach S, Kohlhaas M, Praetorius B. 1994. Ecofor the Future. Discussion Paper no. QE92logical tax reform even if Germany has to go
05.
it alone. Economic Bulletin 31: 3—10.
. 1994. Green taxes: Can we protect the
Bovenberg L, Cnossen S, eds. 1995. Public ecoenvironment and improve the tax system at
nomics and the environment in an imperfect
the same time? Southern Economic Journal
world. Boston: Kluwer Academic.
61:915-922.
[CBO] Congressional Budget Office. 1997. Reducing the deficit: Spending and revenue Olivecrona C. 1995. The carhon dioxide taxes
options. Washington (DC): Government
in Scandinavia. Pages 173—184 in Gale R,
Printing Office. Available from: US GovernBarg S, Gillies A, eds. Green Budget Reform:
ment Printing Office, Mail StopSSOP, WashAn International Casebook of Leading Pracington, DC 20402-9328.
tices. London: Earthscan Puhiications.
FelderS, Sch)einigerR. 1995. Domestic environ- Pearce DW, Turner RK. 1990. Economics of
mental policy and international factor monatural resources and the environment. Balbility: A general equilibrium analysis. Swiss
timore (MD): Johns Hopkins University Press.
Journal of Economics and Statistics 131: Pigou AC. 1920. The economics of welfare.
547-558.
London: Macmillan,
GeeD. 1994. Eco-nomic tax reform: Shifting the Repetto R, Austin D. 1997. The costs of climate
tax burden from economic goods to environprotection: A guide for the perplexed. Washmental bads. European Environment 4: 17ington (DC): World Resources Institute.
22.
Repetto R, Dower R, Jenkins R, Geoghegan J.
Goulder L. 1995. Environmental taxes and the
1992. Green fees: How a tax shift can work
double dividend: A reader's guide. Internafor the environment and the economy. Washtional Tax and Public Finance 2: 157-183.
ington (DC): World Resources Institute.
Hammond J, DeCanion S, Duxbury P, Sanstad Repetto R, Dower R, Gramlich R. 1993. PolluA, Stinson C. 1997. Tax waste, not work:
tion and energy taxes: Their environmental
How changing what we tax can lead to a
and economic benefits. Challenge 36: 9-14.
stronger economy and a cleaner environ- Roodman DM. 1997. Getting the signals right:
ment. San Erancisco: Redefining Progress.
Tax reform to protect the environment and
Hoerner JA. 1995. Tax tools for protecting the
the economy. Washington (DC): Worldwatch
atmosphere: The US ozone-depleting chemiInstitute. Worldwaich Paper no. 134.
cals tax. Pages 185-199 in Gale R, Barg S, Schnutenhaus JO. 1995. Tax differentials for
Gilhes A, eds. Green Budget Reform: An
catalytic converters and unleaded petrol in

mance. They also reflect a degree of
compromise, which is necessary to
find common ground on this intricate topic.

196

Germany. Pages 79-90 in Gale R, Barg S,
Gillies A, eds. Green Budget Reform: An
International Casebook of Leading Practices.
London: Earthscan Publications.
Schob R. 1996. Evaluating tax reforms in the
presence of externalities. Oxford Economic
Papers 48: 537-555.
Von Weizsacker EU, Jesinghaus J. 1992. Ecological tax reform: A policy proposal for
sustainable development. London: Zed
Books.

Steve Bernow is a senior research director
at the Tellus Institute for Resource and
Environmental Strategies, Boston, MA
02116. Robert Costanza is a professor for
the Center for Environmental Science and
Department of Biological Sciences and a
director of the University of Maryland
Institute for Ecological Economics,
Solomons, MD 20688. Herman Daly is a
professor in the School of Public Affairs,
University of Maryland, College Park, MD
20742. Ralph DeGennaro is executive director and Jill Lancelot is legislative director with Taxpayers for Common
Sense,Washington, DC 20003. Dawn
Erlandson is executive director and]. Andrew Hoerner is a senior fellow with the
Center for a Sustainable Economy, Washington, DC 20009. Deeohn Ferris is president of Global Environmental Resources,
Inc., and former executive director of the
Washington Office on Environmental Justice, Washington, DC20005. PaulUawken
is chairman of The Natural Step, Sausalito,
CA 94965. Thomas Marx is director of
economic analysis at the General Motors
Corporation, Detroit, MI 48202. Douglas
Norland is chief economist with Alliance to
SaveEnergy, Washington, DC20036. Irene
Peters is an economist in the Human Ecology Division, Swiss Federal Institute for
Environmental Science and Technology,
Duebendorf, Switzerland, David Roodman
is a senior researcher with Worldwatch
Institute, New York, NY 10025. Claudine
Schneider is director of the Land and Water Fund of the Rockies, Boulder, CO
80301. Priya Shyamsundar is a program
officer of the World Environment Program, MacArthur Foundation, Chicago,
IL 60603 -52 85. John Woodwell is a graduate fellow at the University of Maryland,
Institute for Ecological Economics, College Park, MD 20742. © 1998 American
Institute of Biological Sciences.

BioScience Vol. 48 No. 3

